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:''For the philosophy of Giovanni Gentile, often called actualism, see Actual idealism.'' In contemporary analytic philosophy, actualism is a position on the ontological status of possible worlds that holds that everything that exists (i.e., everything there is) is actual.〔(Actualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) )〕〔Plantinga, Alvin (1976). "Actualism and Possible Worlds". ''Theoria'' 42 (1–3): pp. 139–160. (Reprinted in his compilation ''Essays on the Metaphysics of Modality'', Oxford University Press).〕 Another phrasing of the thesis is that the domain of unrestricted quantification ranges over all and only actual existents.〔Woodward, Richard (2011). "The things that aren't actually there". ''Philosophical Studies'' 152: pp. 155–166.〕 The denial of actualism is possibilism, the thesis that there are some entities that are ''merely possible'': these entities exist (in the same way that ordinary objects around us do) but are not to be found in the actual world. Regarding Modal realism: "An important but significantly different notion of possibilism to which many of the issues in this article do not apply was developed by the philosopher David Lewis."〔 ==Example== Consider the statement "Sherlock Holmes exists." This is a false statement about the world, but is usually accepted as representing a possible truth. This contingency is usually described by the statement "there is a possible world in which Sherlock Holmes exists". The possibilist argues that apparent existential claims such as this (that "there are" possible worlds of various sorts) ought to be taken more or less at face value: as stating the ''existence'' of two or more worlds, only one of which (at the most) can be the actual one. Hence, they argue, there are innumerably many possible worlds other than our own, which exist just as much as ours does. Most actualists will be happy to grant the interpretation of "Sherlock Holmes' existence is possible" in terms of possible worlds. But they argue that the possibilist goes wrong in taking this as a sign that there exist other worlds that are just like ours, except for the fact that we are not actually in them. The actualist argues, instead, that when we claim "possible worlds" exist we are making claims that things exist ''in our own actual world'' which can serve as possible worlds for the interpretation of modal claims: that many ''ways the world could be'' (actually) exist, but not that any ''worlds which are those ways'' exist other than the actual world around us. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Actualism」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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