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Affect (from Latin ''affectus'' or ''adfectus'') is a concept used in the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza and elaborated by (Henri Bergson ), Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari that places emphasis on bodily experience. For Spinoza, as discussed in Parts Two and Three of his ''Ethics'', affects are states of mind and body related to (but not exactly synonymous with) feelings and emotions, of which he says there are three primary kinds: pleasure or joy (''laetitia''),〔Part III, Proposition 56. 〕 pain or sorrow (''tristitia'')〔 and desire (''cupiditas'') or appetite.〔"In truth I cannot recognize any difference between human appetite and desire". 〕 Subsequent philosophical usage by Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari and their translator Brian Massumi, while derived explicitly from Spinoza, tends to distinguish more sharply than Spinoza does between affect and what are conventionally called emotions. Affects are difficult to grasp and conceptualize because, as Spinoza says, "an affect or passion of the mind (pathema'' ) is a confused idea" which is only perceived by the increase or decrease it causes in the body's vital force.〔''Existendi vis'' or power of existence. 〕 The term "affect" is central to what has become known as the "affective turn" in the humanities and social sciences. == In Spinoza == In Spinoza's ''Ethics'', Part III Definition 3, the term "affect" (''affectus'', traditionally translated as "emotion")〔Of the two "standard" English translations, the version by Samuel Shirley uses "emotion" for ''affectus'', whereas the more recent rendering by Edwin Curley uses "affect". 〕 is the modification or variation produced in a body (including the mind) by an interaction with another body ''which increases or diminishes the body's power of activity'' (potentia agendi): :By affect I understand affections of the body by which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections. Affect is thus a special case of the more neutral term "affection" (''affectio''), which designates the form "taken on" by some thing,〔Samuel Shirley, "Translator's Preface". 〕 the mode, state or quality of a body's relation to the world or nature (or infinite "substance"). In Part III, "Definitions of the Emotions/Affects", Spinoza defines 48 different forms of affect, including love and hatred, hope and fear, envy and compassion. They are nearly all manifestations of the three basic affects of: * desire (''cupiditas'') or appetite (''appetitus''), defined as "the very essence of man insofar as his essence is conceived as determined to any action from any given affection of itself"; * pleasure (''laetitia''), defined as "man's transition from a state of less perfection to a state of greater perfection";〔 and * pain or sorrow (''tristitia''), defined as "man's transition from a state of greater perfection to a state of less perfection".〔 In Spinoza's view, since God's power of activity is infinite, any affection which increases the organism's power of activity leads to greater perfection. Affects are transitional states or modes in that they are vital forces by which the organism strives to act against other forces which act on it and continually resist it or hold it in check. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Affect (philosophy)」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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