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Akrasia (; Greek , "lacking command (over oneself)"), occasionally transliterated as acrasia, is the state of acting against one's better judgment. The adjectival form is "akratic".〔Although this philosopher's technical term is usually employed in its Greek form (i.e., akrasia/akratic) in English texts, it was once the philosophers' English language convention to use the precise English equivalent of akrasia/akratic, incontinence/incontinent. However, it now seems that the correct, widely established convention is to use the term akrasia.〕 ==Classical approaches== The problem goes back at least as far as Plato. Socrates (in Plato's ''Protagoras'') asks precisely how this is possible—if one judges action A to be the best course of action, why would one do anything other than A? In the dialogue ''Protagoras'', Socrates attests that akrasia does not exist, claiming “No one goes willingly toward the bad” (358d). If a person examines a situation and decides to act in the way he determines to be best, he will actively pursue this action, as the best course is also the good course, i.e. man's natural goal. An all-things-considered assessment of the situation will bring full knowledge of a decision's outcome and worth linked to well-developed principles of the good. A person, according to Socrates, never chooses to act poorly or against his better judgment; actions that go against what is best are only a product of being ignorant of facts or knowledge of what is best or good. Aristotle on the other hand took a more empirical approach to the question, acknowledging that we intuitively believe in akrasia. He distances himself from the Socratic position by locating the breakdown of reasoning in an agent’s opinion, not his appetition. Now, without recourse to appetitive desires, Aristotle reasons that akrasia occurs as a result of opinion. Opinion is formulated mentally in a way that may or may not imitate truth, while appetites are merely desires of the body. Thus opinion is only incidentally aligned with or opposed to the good, making an akratic action the product of opinion instead of reason. For Aristotle, the antonym of ''akrasia'' is ''enkrateia'', which means "in power" (over oneself).〔http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/#Akr〕 The word ''akrasia'' occurs twice in the Koine Greek New Testament. In Jesus uses it to describe hypocritical religious leaders. The Apostle Paul also gives the threat of temptation through akrasia as a reason for a husband and wife to not deprive each other of sex (). In Edmund Spenser's ''The Faerie Queene'', book II, Acrasia, the embodiment of intemperance dwelling in the "Bower of Bliss", had the Circe-like capacity of transforming her lovers into monstrous animal shapes. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Akrasia」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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