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In philosophy, a computational theory of mind names a view that the human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing system and that thinking is a form of computing. The theory was proposed in its modern form by Hilary Putnam in 1961, and developed by the MIT philosopher and cognitive scientist (and Putnam's PhD student) Jerry Fodor in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.〔Putnam, Hilary, 1961. "Brains and Behavior", originally read as part of the program of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Section L (History and Philosophy of Science), December 27, 1961, reprinted in Block (1983), and also along with other papers on the topic in Putnam, ''Mathematics, Matter and Method'' (1979)〕〔Horst, Steven, (2005) ("The Computational Theory of Mind" ) in ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''〕 Despite being vigorously disputed in analytic philosophy in the 1990s (due to work by Putnam himself, John Searle, and others), the view is common in modern cognitive psychology and is presumed by many theorists of evolutionary psychology; in the 2000s and 2010s the view has resurfaced in analytic philosophy (Scheutz 2003, Edelman 2008). The computational theory of mind holds that the mind is a computation that arises from the brain acting as a computing machine. The theory can be elaborated in many ways, the most popular of which is that the brain is a computer and the mind is the result of the program that the brain runs.〔Block, Ned ''The Mind as the Software of the Brain''〕 A program is the finite description of an algorithm or effective procedure, which prescribes a sequence of discrete actions that produces outputs based only on inputs and the internal states (memory) of the computing machine. For any admissible input, algorithms terminate in a finite number of steps. So the computational theory of mind is the claim that the mind is a computation of a machine (the brain) that derives output representations of the world from input representations and internal memory in a way that is consistent with the theory of computation. Computational theories of mind are often said to require mental representation because 'input' into a computation comes in the form of symbols or representations of other objects. A computer cannot compute an actual object, but must interpret and represent the object in some form and then compute the representation. The computational theory of mind is related to the representational theory of mind in that they both require that mental states are representations. However the two theories differ in that the representational theory claims that all mental states are representations while the computational theory leaves open that certain mental states, such as pain or depression, may not be representational and therefore may not be suitable for a computational treatment. These non-representational mental states are known as qualia. In Fodor's original views, the computational theory of mind is also related to the language of thought. The language of thought theory allows the mind to process more complex representations with the help of semantics. (See below in semantics of mental states). =="Computer metaphor"== Computational theory of mind is not the same as the computer metaphor, comparing the mind to a modern day digital computer.〔Pinker, Steven. The Blank Slate. New York: Penguin. 2002〕 Computational theory just uses some of the same principles as those found in digital computing.〔 'Computer' is not meant to mean a modern day electronic computer. Rather a computer is a symbol manipulator that follows step by step functions to compute input and form output. Alan Turing describes this type of computer in his concept of a Turing Machine. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Computational theory of mind」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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