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Documentality is the theory of documents that underlies the ontology of social reality put forward by the Italian philosopher Maurizio Ferraris (see Ferraris 2007, 2008, 2009a and 2009b).〔For an extended debate on the theory, see (Rescogitans ) and the symposium devoted to the theory in (''Etica & Politica'' 11/2 (2010) )〕 The theory gives to documents a central position within the sphere of social objects, conceived as distinct from physical and ideal objects. Ferraris argues that social objects are "social acts that have been inscribed on some kind of support", be it a paper document, a magnetic support, or even memory in people's heads (e.g. in the case of the promises we make every day). Thus the constitutive rule of social objects is that ''Object = Inscribed Act''. Therefore, documents as inscriptions possessing social relevance and value embody the essential and prototypical features of any social object, and it is on this basis that it is possible to develop an ontology capable of classifying documents and their selective storage, beginning with the grand divide between strong documents (inscriptions of acts), which make up social objects in the full sense, and weak documents (recordings of facts), which are secondary derivatives and of lesser importance. This theory is inspired, on the one hand, by the reflection on the centrality of writing developed by Jacques Derrida (1967, 1972) and, on the other hand, by the theory of social acts devised by Adolf Reinach (1913) and the theory of linguistic acts by John L. Austin (1962). ==Searle: X counts as Y in C== In the contemporary debate, one of the main theories of social objects〔For the position of Documentality in the contemporary debate on social ontology, See Torrengo 2009. For a critical comparison between the social ontology put forward by Searle and Documentality, see Casetta 2010.〕 has been proposed by the American philosopher John R. Searle, in particular in his book ''The Construction of Social Reality'' (1995). Searle's ontology recognizes the sphere of social objects, defining them as higher order objects with respect to physical objects, in accordance with the rule ''X counts as Y in C'' meaning that the physical object X, for instance a colored piece of paper, counts as Y, a 10 euro banknote, in context C, the Europe of the year 2010. According to Searle, from the iteration of this simple rule the whole complexity of social reality is derived. Powerful it may be, the theory runs – according to Ferraris – into problems. Firstly, it is not at all obvious how, from the physical object, we manage to get to the social object. If any physical object really can constitute the origin of a social object, then it is not clear what would prevent ''every'' physical object to turn into a social object. But clearly it is not the case that, for instance, if you decide to draw a banknote, you thereby produce a banknote.〔M. Ferraris, ''Dove sei? Ontologia del telefonino'', Milano, Bompiani, 2005: pp. 225-228 and M. Ferraris, ''Documentalità. Perché è necessario lasciar tracce'', Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2009: pp. 170-173.〕 The standard theory relies on key notion of "collective intentionality" to explain the transfiguration of X in Y. However, such a notion – as Ferraris argues – is not at all as clear as it purports to be.〔M. Ferraris, ''Dove sei?'', cit.: pp. 214-225 and M. Ferraris, ''Documentalità'', cit.: pp. 163-170.〕 Secondly, how does the reversibility from the social to the physical sphere work? It is fairly intuitive to assert that a banknote is also a piece of paper, or that a President is also a person. As much as it is true that when Searle is alone in a hotel room there is only one physical object, but many social objects (a husband, an employee of the state of California, an American citizen, a driving license holder etc.). In this case, the passage back from Y (the social) to X (the physical) goes smoothly. However, things change in different, although not very peculiar, situations. How should we deal with vague or vast entities, such as a State, a battle, a university? And how about negative entities, such as debts?〔M. Ferraris, ''Dove sei?'', cit.: pp. 229-233 and M. Ferraris, ''Documentalità'', cit.: pp. 173-176.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Documentality」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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