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Emotivism is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes.〔Garner and Rosen, ''Moral Philosophy'', chapter 13 ("Noncognitivist Theories") and Brandt, ''Ethical Theory'', chapter 9 ("Noncognitivism") regard the ethical theories of Ayer, Stevenson and Hare as noncognitivist ones.〕〔Ogden and Richards, ''Meaning'', 125: "'Good' is alleged to stand for a unique, unanalyzable concept … () is the subject matter of ethics. This peculiar ethical use of 'good' is, we suggest, a purely emotive use. … Thus, when we so use it in the sentence, Emotivism can be considered a form of non-cognitivism or expressivism. It stands in opposition to other forms of non-cognitivism (such as quasi-realism and universal prescriptivism), as well as to all forms of cognitivism (including both moral realism and ethical subjectivism). In the 1950s, emotivism appeared in a modified form in the universal prescriptivism of R. M. Hare.〔Brandt, ''Ethical Theory'', 221: "A recent book (Language of Morals'' ) by R. M. Hare has proposed a view, otherwise very similar to the emotive theory, with modifications …"〕〔Wilks, ''Emotion'', 79: "… while Hare was, no doubt, a critic of the (theory ), he was, in the eyes of his own critics, a kind of emotivist himself. His theory, as a consequence, has sometimes been depicted as a reaction against emotivism and at other times as an extension of it."〕 ==History== Emotivism reached prominence in the early 20th century, but it was born centuries earlier. In 1710, George Berkeley wrote that language in general often serves to inspire feelings as well as communicate ideas.〔Berkeley, ''Treatise'', paragraph 20: "The communicating of Ideas marked by Words is not the chief and only end of Language, as is commonly supposed. There are other Ends, as the raising of some Passion, the exciting to, or deterring from an Action, the putting the Mind in some particular Disposition …"〕 Decades later, David Hume espoused ideas similar to Stevenson's later ones.〔Stevenson, ''Ethics'', 273: "Of all traditional philosophers, Hume has most clearly asked the questions that here concern us, and has most nearly reached a conclusion that the present writer can accept."〕 In his 1751 book ''An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals'', Hume considered morality to be related to fact but "determined by sentiment": G. E. Moore published his ''Principia Ethica'' in 1903 and argued that the attempts of ethical naturalists to translate ethical terms (like ''good'' and ''bad'') into non-ethical ones (like ''pleasing'' and ''displeasing'') committed the "naturalistic fallacy". Moore was a cognitivist, but his case against ethical naturalism steered other philosophers toward noncognitivism, particularly emotivism.〔Moore, ''Ethics'', x: "Although this critique (ethical naturalism ) had a powerful impact, the appeal of Moore's nonnaturalistic cognitivism was, by contrast, relatively weak. In the decades following ''Principia'', many philosophers who were persuaded by the former ended up abandoning cognitivism altogether in favor of the position that distinctively ethical discourse is not cognitive at all, but rather an expression of attitude or emotion."〕 The emergence of logical positivism and its verifiability criterion of meaning early in the 20th century led some philosophers to conclude that ethical statements, being incapable of empirical verification, were cognitively meaningless. This criterion was fundamental to A.J. Ayer's defense of positivism in ''Language, Truth and Logic'', which contains his statement of emotivism. However, positivism is not essential to emotivism itself, perhaps not even in Ayer's form,〔Wilks, ''Emotion'', 1: "… I do not take Ayer's ethical theory to hinge in any necessarily dependent sense upon his verificationist thesis … I take his ethical theory to hinge upon his verificationist thesis only to the extent that it assumes logic and empirical verification (and combinations thereof) to be the only means of firmly establishing the truth or falsity of any claim to knowledge."〕 and some positivists in the Vienna Circle, which had great influence on Ayer, held non-emotivist views.〔Satris, ''Ethical Emotivism'', 23: "Utilitarian, rationalist and cognitivist positions are in fact maintained by the members of the Vienna Circle who wrote in the fields of ethics, social theory and value theory, namely, Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, Viktor Kraft and Karl Menger."〕 R. M. Hare unfolded his ethical theory of universal prescriptivism in 1952's ''The Language of Morals'', intending to defend the importance of rational moral argumentation against the "propaganda" he saw encouraged by Stevenson, who thought moral argumentation was sometimes psychological and not rational.〔Hare, ''Language'', 14–15: "The suggestion, that the function of moral judgments was to persuade, led to a difficulty in distinguishing their functions from that of propaganda. … It does not matter whether the means used to persuade are fair or foul, so long as they do persuade. And therefore the natural reaction to the realization that someone is trying to persuade us is 'He's trying to get at me; I must be on my guard …' Such a reaction to moral judgments should not be encouraged by philosophers." After Pepper, ''Ethics'', 297.〕 But Hare's disagreement was not universal, and the similarities between his noncognitive theory and the emotive one — especially his claim, and Stevenson's, that moral judgments contain commands and are thus not purely descriptive — caused some to regard him as an emotivist, a classification he denied: 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Emotivism」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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