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NRMP : ウィキペディア英語版
National Resident Matching Program
The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), also called the Match,〔(NRMP homepage ) Retrieved on June 23, 2010〕 is a United States-based private non-profit non-governmental organization created in 1952 to help match medical school students with residency programs. The NRMP is sponsored by the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS), the American Medical Association (AMA), the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), the American Hospital Association (AHA), and the Council of Medical Specialty Societies (CMSS).
== History ==
The National Resident Match Program began in 1952〔()〕 in response to dissatisfaction with the process and results of matching applicants to residency programs via the decentralized, competitive market. From shortly after the first residency programs were formally introduced, the hiring process was "characterized by intense competition among hospitals for (an inadequate supply) of interns."〔
: Description of market based on 〕 In general, hospitals benefited from filling their positions as early as possible, and applicants benefited from delaying acceptance of positions. The combination of these factors led to offers being made for positions up to two years in advance. While efforts made to delay the start of the application process were somewhat effective, they ultimately resulted in very short deadlines for responses by applicants, and the opportunities for dissatisfaction on the part of both applicants and hospitals remained.〔 The students in 1951 protested against the originally proposed matching algorithm, and objected to the hospital-optimal nature of the proposed algorithm.〔Medical seniors hit interne plan. New York Times 1951; 22 Oct:25 (col. 1).〕〔Shiller JG. An alum recalls the first matching plan. P&S: The Journal of the College of Physicians & Surgeons of Columbia University 1985; 5:29.〕〔Williams KJ. A reexamination of the NRMP matching algorithm. Acad Med 1995; 70:470-476.〕 The NRMP stated that students from 1951 objected to an algorithm that gave them incentives to misrepresent their true preferences.〔Peranson E, Randlett R. Comments on Williams' "A reexamination of the NRMP matching algorithm". Acad Med. 1995;70:490-494. (footnote at the bottom of page 492)〕
A publication in 1962 by Gale & Shapley noted that there always exists a stable solution when colleges are matching with students, but that it is possible to favor colleges as a group over applicants as a group (and vice versa).〔Gale D, Shapley LS. College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematics Monthly. 1962;69:9-15.〕 That is, Gale & Shapley found that there is a college-optimal stable match and an applicant-optimal stable match.〔
Controversy arose regarding whether the program was susceptible to manipulation or unreasonably fair to employers.〔Roth "Redesign" 748〕 Indeed, it was shown that in simple cases (i.e. those that exclude couples, second-year programs, and special cases for handling unfilled slots) that had multiple "stable" matchings, the algorithm would return the solution that was best for the hospitals and worst for the applicants.〔Gusfield "Stable Marriage" 64 references as proving that the pre-1995 algorithm is essentially the hospital-optimal algorithm described in Gusfield 39. Gusfield 41 demonstrates that the hospital-optimal algorithm is also applicant-pessimal.〕 It was also susceptible to collusion on the part of hospitals: if hospitals were to organize their preference lists properly, the result returned would be completely unaffected by the preference lists of the residents. A correspondence in ''New England Journal of Medicine'' in 1981 recognized that the algorithm in use was hospital-optimal for individual applicants,〔Williams KJ, Werth VP, Wolff JA. An analysis of the resident match. N Engl J Med. 1981;304:1165-1166; correspondence in N Engl J Med. 1981;305:526〕 in direct contradiction to the NRMP's published statements.〔NIRMP Directory. Evanston, Illinois: National Intern and Resident Matching Program; 1979.〕 The promotional NRMP literature was revised to remove the detailed, step-by-step description of their algorithm that had been there before.〔, comparing the following NRMP descriptions:
*NIRMP Directory. Evanston, Illinois: National Intern and Resident Matching Program; 1979.
*NRMP Directory. Evanston, Illinois: National Resident Matching Program; 1983.〕
Later researchers, such as Marilda Sotomayor in 1983, Alvin Roth in 1984, and Klaus et al. in 2007, found that when couples are allowed to match together, there may exist no stable matching.〔Roth AE. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory. Journal of Political Economy 1984; 92:991-1016.〕〔Klaus B, Klijn F, Massó J. Some things couples always wanted to knowabout stable matchings (but were afraid to ask). Review of Economic Design 2007; 11:175-184.〕
A small, independent match for Ophthalmology switched to an updated algorithm as announced in February 1996,〔Colenbrander A. Ophthalmology match heeds students' concerns. AUPO flyer, February 1996〕〔Williams KJ. Examining the NRMP algorithm. Acad Med 1996; 71:310-312.〕〔Colenbrander A. Match algorithms revisited. Acad Med 1996; 71:414-415.〕 and may have served as a prototype and incitement for the NRMP to update the algorithm.
Despite many indications for updating the NRMP algorithm, it saw only minor and incremental changes after its institution in 1952 until 1997.〔〔 However, in the fall of 1995 the Board of Directors of the NRMP commissioned a preliminary research program for the evaluation of the current algorithm and of changes to be considered in its operation and description,〔(Evaluation of changes to be considered in the NRMP algorithm ), by Alvin E. Roth. October 24, 1995〕 and a study comparing a new algorithm with the existing one.〔Roth "Redesign" 749〕 The new algorithm was adopted in May 1997 and has been in use since its first application in March 1998,〔 although the study showed that the net effect of the change on actual matches has been minimal.〔Roth "Redesign" 752, 760〕

抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア(Wikipedia)
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