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''ドイツ語:Truppenführung'' ("''Handling of Combined-Arms Formations''") was a German Army field manual published in 2 parts as ドイツ語:Heeresdienstvorschrift 300: Part 1, promulgated in 1933, and Part 2 in 1934. The original German text, which is notable for its clarity, was prepared by a group led by Colonel General Ludwig Beck (1880–1944) who was later executed by the National Socialist regime for his part in the 1944 plot against Hitler. The original publication consisted of a two-part, soft cover, pocket-sized manual, which was issued to all commissioned officers and senior non-commissioned officers. It contained basic military doctrine for the German land forces (''ドイツ語:Heer'') from its first publication up to the end of World War II. The book was known by the nickname "Tante Frieda". A modified form is still in use today by the Federal German Army (''ドイツ語:Deutsches Heer''). The approximate equivalent U.S. Army field manual was FM 100–5, now re-issued as FM 3–0, Operations (with later revisions) and available for download at the U.S. Army website. The British Army equivalent manual is ''Field Service Regulations'', also available for download at the British Army website. ==Background== ''ドイツ語:Truppenführung'' has its doctrinal origins in the late 19th century Prussian army although its traditions go back to the Scharnhorst reforms of 1810–1812. The modern basis of this Field Manual can be seen in the reforms of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder in the mid 19th century. It was in Moltke’s "Instructions for Large Unit Commanders" and his concept of separated armies from which modern German doctrine emerged. The system of moving units separately and concentrating as an army before a battle, resulted in more efficient supply and lower vulnerability to modern firepower. To enable a successful flanking attack, he asserted that concentration could only take place after the commencement of a battle. This was a development of the Scharnhorst concept of "March Divided, Fight United". A consequence of this innovation was the commander's loss of overall control of his forces, due to the limits of means of communication which, at that time were visual (line-of-sight) or couriers, either mounted or on foot. The traditional concept of the elimination of uncertainty by means of ''total obedience'' became obsolete and operational initiative had to be delegated to a point further down the chain of command. In this new concept, commanders of distant detachments were required to exercise initiative in their decision making and Moltke emphasised the benefits of developing officers, who could do this within the limits of the senior commander’s intention. He accomplished this by means of directives stating his intentions, rather than detailed orders and was willing to accept deviations from a directive, provided that it was within the framework of the mission. Moltke held this view firmly and it later became a fundamental of all German military theory. Other theorists were critical but Moltke’s insistence that local commanders be allowed freedom of action, has been defended by many German writers together with the concept that large armies made a loose style of command necessary. Prussian and German Field Service Regulations published after 1870 confirm this concept and it is listed, word for word, in ''ドイツ語:Truppenführung'' of 1933: 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Truppenführung」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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