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belief
Belief is the state of mind in which a person thinks something to be the case, with or without there being empirical evidence to prove that something is the case with factual certainty. In other words, belief is when someone thinks something is reality, true, when they have no absolute verified foundation for their certainty of the truth or realness of something.〔Oxford Dictionaries - (definition ) published by OUP (2015-08-08 )〕 Another way of defining belief is, it is a mental representation of an attitude positively orientated towards the likelihood of something being true. In the context of Ancient Greek thought, two related concepts were identified with regards to the concept of belief: ''pistis'' and ''doxa''. Simplified, we may say that pistis refers to ''trust'' and ''confidence'', while doxa refers to ''opinion'' and ''acceptance''. The English word ''doctrine'' is derived from ''doxa''.
In epistemology, philosophers use the term ‘belief’ to refer to personal attitudes associated with true or false ideas and concepts. However, ‘belief’ does not require active introspection and circumspection. For example, we never ponder whether or not the sun will rise. We simply assume the sun will rise. Since ‘belief’ is an important aspect of mundane life, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the question that must be answered is, “how a physical organism can have beliefs” (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/).
==Knowledge and epistemology==
Epistemology is concerned with delineating the boundary between justified belief and opinion,〔Oxford Dictionaries - (definition ) published by OUP (2015-08-09 )〕 and involved generally with a theoretical philosophical study of knowledge. The primary problem in epistemology is to understand exactly what is needed in order for us to have knowledge. In a notion derived from Plato's dialogue ''Theaetetus'', where the epistemology of Socrates (Platon) most clearly departs from that of the sophists, who at the time of Plato seem to have defined knowledge as what is here expressed as "justified true belief". The tendency to translate from belief (here: doxa - common opinion) to knowledge (here: episteme), which Plato (e.g. Socrates of the dialogue) utterly dismisses, results from failing to distinguish a dispositive belief (gr. 'doxa', not 'pistis') from knowledge (episteme) when the opinion is regarded ''true'' (here: orthé), in terms of right, and juristically so (according to the premises of the dialogue). Which was the task of the rhetors to prove. Plato dismisses this possibility of an affirmative relation between belief (i.e. opinion) and knowledge even when the one who opines grounds his belief on the rule, and is able to add ''justification'' (gr. logos: reasonable and necessarily plausible assertions/evidence/guidance) to it ().〔http://www.friesian.com/knowledg.htm - Copyright (c) 2007, 2008 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved〕 It is important to keep in mind that the sort of belief in the context of ''Theaetetus'' is not derived from the theological concept of belief, which is ''pistis'', but ''doxa'', which in theological terms refers to acceptance in the form of praise and glory.
Strangely, or not, Plato has been credited for the "''justified true belief''" theory of knowledge, even though Plato in the Theaetetus (dialogue) elegantly dismisses it, and even posits this argument of Socrates as a cause for his death penalty . Among American epistemologists, Gettier (1963) and Goldman (1967), have questioned the "justified true belief" definition, and challenged the "sophists" of their time.
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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