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Noema (plural: ''noemata'') derives from the Greek word νόημα meaning thought or what is thought about.〔Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu (ed.s) ''The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy'', Wiley-Blackwell, 2004, p. 473〕 Edmund Husserl used ''noema'' as a technical term in phenomenology to stand for the object or content of a thought, judgment, or perception, but its precise meaning in his work has remained a matter of controversy. ==Husserl's noema== In ''Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology'' (1913), Husserl introduced the terms "noema" and "noesis" to designate correlated elements of the structure of any intentional act — for example, an act of perceiving, or judging, or remembering (see Intentionality): "Corresponding to all points to the manifold data of the real (''reelle'') noetic content, there is a variety of data displayable in really pure (''wirklicher reiner'') intuition, and in a correlative 'noematic content,' or briefly 'noema' — terms which we shall henceforth be continually using."〔Edmund Husserl, ''Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology'' (also known as ''Ideas I''), trans. W. Boyce Gibson, Collier Books, 1962, p. 238〕 Every intentional act has noetic content (or a noesis — from the Greek nous, "mind"). This noetic content, to which the noema corresponds, is that mental act-process (e.g., an act of liking, of judging, of meaning, etc.) which becomes directed towards the intentionally held object (e.g., the liked as liked, judged as judged, or meant as meant).〔Dermot Moran, ''Edmund Husserl: founder of phenomenology'' Polity, 2005, p133〕 That is to say, every act has, as part of its formation, a noematic correlate, which is the object of the act — that which is intended by it.〔Edmund Husserl, ''Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology'' (also known as ''Ideas I''), trans. W. Boyce Gibson, Collier Books, 1962, p229〕 In other words, every intentional act has an "I-pole (the origin of the noesis)" and an "object-pole (or noema)."〔Jean-Francois Lyotard, ''Phenomenology'', trans. Brian Beakley, SUNY Press, 1991, p55〕 Husserl also refers to the noema as the ''Sinn'' or sense (meaning) of the act, and sometimes appears to use the terms interchangeably. Nevertheless, the ''Sinn'' does not represent what Husserl calls the "full noema": ''Sinn'' belongs to the noema, but the full noema is the object of the act ''as meant'' in the act, the perceived object ''as'' perceived, the judged object ''as'' judged, and so on.〔Dermot Moran, ''Edmund Husserl: founder of phenomenology'' Polity, 2005, p135; see also Edmund Husserl, ''Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology'' (also known as ''Ideas I''), trans. W. Boyce Gibson, Collier Books, 1962, p. 238〕 In other words, the noema seems to be whatever is intended by acts of perception or judgement in general, whether it be "a material object, a picture, a word, a mathematical entity, another person" precisely ''as'' being perceived, judged or otherwise thought about.〔Robert Solokowski, ''Introduction to Phenomenology'', Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 59〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「noema」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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