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In metaphysical philosophy, particulars are concrete entities existing in space and time as opposed to abstractions. There are, however, theories of ''abstract particulars'' or ''tropes''. For example, Socrates is a particular (there's only one Socrates-the-teacher-of-Plato and one cannot make copies of him, e.g., by cloning him, without introducing new, distinct particulars). Redness, by contrast, is not a particular, because it is abstract and multiply instantiated (my bicycle, this apple, and that woman's hair are all red). Sybil Wolfram〔Sybil Wolfram, Philosophical Logic, Routledge, London and New York, 1989, ISBN 0-415-02317-3, page 55〕 writes
Some terms are used by philosophers with a rough-and-ready idea of their meaning. This can occur if there is lack of agreement about the best definition of the term. In formulating a solution to the problem of universals, the term 'particular' can be used to describe the ''particular'' instance of redness of a certain apple as opposed to the 'universal' 'redness' (being abstract). See also type-token distinction The term particular is also used as a modern equivalent of the Aristotelian notion of individual substance. Used in this sense, particular can mean any concrete (individual) entity, irrespective of whether it is spatial and temporal or not. ==See also== * Epistemological particularism * Moral particularism * Type-token distinction * Pierce's type-token distinction 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「particular」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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