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In philosophy, qualia ( or ; singular form: quale) are individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term "qualia" derives from the Latin neuter plural form (''qualia'') of the Latin adjective ''quālis'' ((:ˈkwaːlis)) meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind"). Examples of qualia include the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett (b. 1942), American philosopher and cognitive scientist, regards ''qualia'' as "an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us". Erwin Schrödinger (1887–1961), the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: Much of the debate over their importance hinges on the definition of the term, and various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia. As such, the nature and existence of qualia remain controversial. == Definitions == There are many definitions of qualia, which have changed over time. One of the simpler, broader definitions is: "The 'what it is like' character of mental states. The way it feels to have mental states such as pain, seeing red, smelling a rose, etc." Clarence Irving Lewis, in his book ''Mind and the World Order'' (1929), was the first to use the term "qualia" in its generally agreed upon modern sense. Frank Jackson (1982) later defined qualia as "...certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical information includes" (p. 273). Daniel Dennett identifies four properties that are commonly ascribed to qualia. According to these, qualia are: # ''ineffable''; that is, they cannot be communicated, or apprehended by any other means than direct experience. # ''intrinsic''; that is, they are non-relational properties, which do not change depending on the experience's relation to other things. # ''private''; that is, all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible. # ''directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness''; that is, to experience a quale is to know one experiences a quale, and to know all there is to know about that quale. If qualia of this sort exist, then a normally sighted person who sees red would be unable to describe the experience of this perception in such a way that a listener who has never experienced color will be able to know everything there is to know about that experience. Though it is possible to make an analogy, such as "red looks hot", or to provide a description of the conditions under which the experience occurs, such as "it's the color you see when light of 700-nm wavelength is directed at you", supporters of this kind of qualia contend that such a description is incapable of providing a complete description of the experience. Another way of defining qualia is as "raw feels". A ''raw feel'' is a perception in and of itself, considered entirely in isolation from any effect it might have on behavior and behavioral disposition. In contrast, a ''cooked feel'' is that perception seen as existing in terms of its effects. For example, the perception of the taste of wine is an ineffable, raw feel, while the experience of warmth or bitterness caused by that taste of wine would be a cooked feel. A cooked feel is not qualia. According to an argument put forth by Saul Kripke in his paper "Identity and Necessity" (1971), one key consequence of the claim that such things as raw feels can be meaningfully discussed—that qualia exist—is that it leads to the logical possibility of two entities exhibiting identical behavior in all ways despite one of them entirely lacking qualia. While very few ever claim that such an entity, called a philosophical zombie, actually exists, the mere possibility is claimed to be sufficient to refute physicalism. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「qualia」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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